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I. Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “the
Commission”) is an independent regulatory agency charged with regulation
of interstate communications by wire and radio in order to promote
efficient, widespread, and economically priced communications services in
the Communications Act.1 The FCC issued a highly controversial statutory
reinterpretation in a recent order in which the FCC subjected providers of
broadband Internet access service (“BIAS”) to Title II regulations.2 The
previous interpretation of cable modem broadband access service classified
the service as a Title I information service, subject to light-handed
regulation.3 In 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the previous interpretation
*

John B. Meisel is emeritus professor of Economics at Southern Illinois University,
Edwardsville. Dr. Meisel received his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston College. His recent
research interests have focused on the impact of the Internet on telecommunications law and
policy. He wishes to thank the staff of Comm/Ent for their excellent editorial assistance in
preparation of the article.
1. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2012).
2. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory
Ruling, and Order, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 15-24 (rel. Mar. 12, 2015), 30 FCC Rcd. 5601
(2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order].
3. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband
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in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Services
and granted deference to the FCC’s interpretation.4
The reclassification decision is currently under review by the D.C.
Circuit.5 At issue is whether the FCC has the authority to issue such a
reinterpretation of an Internet-based service despite the fact that the
regulatory framework that was originally designed for the telephone
system. Deference to an agency’s interpretation is rooted in judicial
precedent established by the Supreme Court’s landmark 1984 decision,
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.6 The Court
held that an agency’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
congressional regulatory statutes are entitled to deference from reviewing
courts.7 Nonetheless, one might expect reviewing courts to exhibit
deference to the FCC’s reclassification decision given the precedent
established by the Brand X decision. However, recent Supreme Court
decisions have cast doubt on the Court’s willingness to apply the two-step
Chevron test to the FCC decision. These post-Brand X decisions establish
that the ultimate outcome of the reclassification decision is unclear because
if an agency’s statutory interpretation implicates an issue of great economic
and political significance, reviewing courts may not grant deference to an
executive agency’s decision.8 The characterization of a question as one of
great economic and political significance will also be referred to as a
“major question.”
The goal of this article is to assess whether the FCC’s reclassification
decision will receive deference under Chevron, which ,since its inception in
1984, has been increasingly subject to limitations.9 Part I describes the
framework and the two-step test presented in Chevron, as well as the
Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, CS Docket No. 02-52 (rel.
Mar. 15, 2002), 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002).
4. 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005).
5. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Case No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. filed
Aug. 6, 2015); see also Harold Feld, My Amazingly Short (For Me) Quickie Reaction to Oral
Argument, WETMACHINE: TALES OF THE SAUSAGE FACTORY (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.wetmac
hine.com/tales-of-the-sausage-factory/my-amazingly-short-for-me-quickie-reaction-to-oral-argum
ent/ (providing a summary of the oral argument before the D.C. Circuit).
6. Chevron USA v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. Id. at 842–43.
8. Usually, such a characterization refers to an agency interpretation that considerably
expands the power of the agency or changes the existing regulatory structure in a fundamental
way. See, e.g., Food & Drug Agency v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000).
9. “Although the Supreme Court often disagrees over how Chevron applies to resolve a
given case, in the thirty years since deciding Chevron, the Court has never wavered significantly
from its commitment to the validity of the Chevron standard.” Kristin E. Hickman, The
(Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56 (2015).
Nevertheless, there are substantive differences over the extent of the standard’s applicability.
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emergence of limits on the use of the test. The limitations are manifested
in the creation of a “step zero” which identifies necessary conditions that
must be satisfied before proceeding to the two-step test. Part II introduces
and analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions that are likely to affect the
2015 Open Internet reclassification decision. Part II also discusses the
growing concern among members of the Supreme Court over the expansion
in size and authority of the administrative state and the future reliance on
agency deference. Part III provides a brief conclusion.

II. The Chevron Framework.
The Chevron decision was highly innovative with its development of a
two-step test for balancing interpretive power between agencies and the
courts. Statutes contain instructions from Congress as to how a specific
regulatory regime should be implemented. Some of these instructions
clearly state the intent of Congress, while others (if not most) contain an
element of ambiguity.10 In step 1 of Chevron analysis, the reviewing court
is solely responsible for determining whether the statutory language clearly
expresses the intent of Congress in answering the specific question under
consideration.11 If the intent is clear, then Congress’s interpretation must
be given full effect, and the court’s analysis ends.12 Both the court and the
agency must adopt the unambiguous intent of Congress. This step enforces
Congress’s legislative power when the legislative intent is clear. However,
a statute often contains ambiguous language that is open to different
reasonable interpretations, requiring an analysis of step two.
If the court finds that the statutory language is ambiguous as to
Congress’s intent, then the court begins step 2 of the Chevron analysis.13
Ambiguous language presumes that Congress has given the agency the
discretion to choose its preferred option from the set of policy options.
These policy options, referred to as the “policy space,” are considered to be
reasonable interpretations of the unclear statute.14 The court is responsible
for determining the boundaries of the policy space available for the agency.
10. For purposes of the article, ambiguity is defined to be present when more than one
reasonable interpretation of the statute in question exists. The focus of the article concerns which
federal government institution should have the interpretive authority to resolve the ambiguity.
11. Chevron at 842–43.
12. Id. at 842.
13. Id. at 843.
14. The descriptive term “policy space” is adopted from legal scholar E. Donald Elliott. See
E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress,
Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (2005). The article is a
highly insightful account of the real world effects of Chevron regarding how actual policy choices
are made and who has the power within an agency to influence such decisions as an
administrative agency administers a regulatory statute characterized by significant ambiguity.
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If the agency selects a policy option from within that space, the option is
deemed a permissible and reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous
language.15 The court then defers to the agency’s interpretation regardless
if the court agrees it is the best option within the policy space.16 However,
if the court determines that the policy option selected by the agency is
outside the bounds of a reasonable policy option—outside the policy
space—the court may reject the agency’s interpretation.17 The two-step
Chevron analysis provided a novel solution to help determine which branch
of government Congress has delegated power to interpret ambiguous
statutory language, based on a critical implicit assumption that
interpretation of ambiguous language is a resolution of a policy dispute.18
In Chevron, at issue was the meaning of the term “stationary source.”19
Using the ordinary tools of statutory construction, the D.C. Circuit
determined that the term was ambiguous.20 The Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) considered two interpretations of “stationary source”
within the policy space—single source or bubble concept—and the EPA
selected the bubble concept option.21 The D.C. Circuit rejected the EPA’s
interpretation because it determined that it was not the best of the
reasonable options.22 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the D.C.
Circuit “misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at
issue,” and instead found the EPA’s policy choice to be the appropriate
interpretation since it was deemed a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous
language.23
The 2015 Open Internet Order involves the statutory definition of
telecommunications service and its application to the factual particulars of
BIAS to determine if broadband access service qualifies as a
telecommunications service.24 In Brand X, the Supreme Court analyzed a
similar order to determine whether the factual particulars of cable modem
Internet access service were such that the service contained a distinct
15. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
16. Id. at 845.
17. See id.
18. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L. J. 2225, 2228–
29 (1997) (“Thus, the [Chevron] Court recognized that the process of adopting constructions of
an ambiguous statute is not resolution of an issue of law, but resolution of a policy dispute. The
Court assigned the task of resolving such policy disputes to agencies.”).
19. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
20. Id. at 841.
21. Id. at 840.
22. Id. at 842.
23. Id. at 845. It is not clear that the D.C. Circuit misconceived its role based on preChevron jurisprudence but rather that the Supreme Court in its opinion changed the role of
reviewing courts.
24. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 2.
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telecommunications service component.25 The Court first determined that
the statutory definition of “offer” in terms of telecommunications service
was ambiguous under its Chevron step 1 analysis.26 Under Chevron step 2
analysis, the Court deemed two options were reasonable choices within the
policy space for the FCC to select: (1) cable modem service did not contain
a distinct telecommunications service but instead was an integrated
information service; or (2) cable modem service contained two distinct
components, a telecommunications service and an information service.27
The FCC chose the integrated information service classification, and the
Supreme Court upheld the interpretation.28 In the 2015 Open Internet
Order, the FCC reconsidered this previous interpretation characterized by
changing facts and circumstances, and reclassified BIAS solely as a
telecommunications service subject to Title II regulations.29 However, the
FCC felt it was unnecessary to impose all of the regulations and used its
forbearance authority to exempt them from several major Title II
regulations in order to adapt the regulatory regime to the realities of the
Internet.30
Chevron identified three main justifications for allocation of
interpretive authority to agencies: (1) agency expertise and familiarity with
the intimate details of the regulatory regime; (2) the political accountability
of agencies, under the supervision of the President, for the resolution of
policy disputes; and (3) the intent of Congress to delegate interpretive
authority to agencies to resolve ambiguities in statutory language.31 The
Chevron framework assumes that agencies are better prepared to resolve
questions of interpretation that implicate policy tradeoffs attributable to
statutory ambiguity compared to unelected judges with general
knowledge.32 A strength of the Chevron framework is that it works to
prevent the judiciary from intruding on policy disputes that are the proper
responsibility of the political branches of government. It is unquestionably
true that initially Chevron significantly increased the authority of executive

25. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989–91 (2005).
26. Id. at 986–87.
27. Id. at 970.
28. Id. at 971.
29. Pierre C. Hines, The Third Way 2.0: Evaluating the Title II Reclassification and
Forbearance Approach to Net Neutrality, 103 GEO. L.J. 1609, 1628 (2015) (explaining the
factual circumstances that have changed since the FCC’s 2002 order).
30. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 2, ¶¶ 331–409, 456–536. The FCC has granted
forbearance from some of the stricter Title II regulations such as no unbundling of last-mile
facilities, no tariffing, no rate regulation, and no cost accounting rules.
31. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
32. See id. at 865.
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agencies by granting deference to their statutory interpretations.33 It thus
disrupted the prevailing balance of power between the branches of the
federal government because Chevron transferred lawmaking power from
Congress to agencies, and interpretative power from the courts to
agencies.34 At the same time, a weakness of the Chevron framework is the
judiciary’s limited ability to ensure that the executive branch does not
encroach on the policymaking responsibilities of the legislative branch.
This concern has resulted in ongoing judicial efforts to limit the executive
branch’s legislative and judicial powers in order to restore proper power
back to Congress and the courts.
Attempts to limit the balance of power consequences of Chevron
resulted in the creation of “step zero” prior to invoking the Chevron
analysis.35 Step zero identifies conditions that must be satisfied prior to
utilizing the two-step framework.36 One prior condition of interest is
whether, in the case of statutory ambiguity, Congress intended to delegate
interpretive authority to an agency. The Chevron decision was viewed as
expanding, in the face of ambiguity, the power of agencies in a relatively
unconstrained manner.37
Whether a congressional delegation exists is often connected to
whether the issue requiring interpretation is one of significant economic
and political interest, or a “major question.”38 This connection was first
discussed by the Supreme Court when the Food and Drug Agency (“FDA”)
interpreted the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to authorize regulation of
tobacco products.39 The Supreme Court considered the statutory language,
33. See Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive’s
Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141 (2012).
34. Id.
35. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001) (coining the term “step zero”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VIRGINIA L. REV.
187 (2006) (explaining the historical development of the step zero conditions in relevant Supreme
Court cases).
36. A complete step zero inquiry would include important issues such as the form of the
agency interpretation and whether the agency used its general lawmaking or adjudicatory powers
in forming its interpretation. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). These two
threshold requirements in Mead are not explored below since they are unlikely to be subject to
dispute in the 2015 Open Internet case.
37. Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 759
(2014) (“Taken literally, the idea that any gap or ambiguity is an implied delegation to an agency
would represent a massive expansion of administrative authority.”); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 460
(1989) (“Chevron’s language so narrowly circumscribed the judicial function in statutory
interpretation that it was difficult, at first, to believe Justice Stevens’ opinion could be taken
literally.”). Justice Stevens, of course, was the author of the Chevron decision.
38. See Food & Drug Agency v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
39. Food & Drug Agency v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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regulatory structure, and subsequent congressional action.40 In its Chevron
step 1 analysis, the Court concluded the statute’s intent was clear, and thus
the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.41 The Court
placed the greatest weight on its evaluation of the actual intent of Congress
rather than on the literal wording of the disputed statute.42 Although
resolving the issue at Chevron step 1, the Court then discussed the idea that
Congress was unlikely to delegate such an important question to an
agency.43 This suggests that the concerns that led to the creation of step
zero motivated the Court to pursue a more aggressive step 1 statutory
interpretation. The presence of a “major question” has played a key role in
recent Supreme Court cases, and will likely affect how the D.C. Circuit
rules in the challenge to the 2015 Open Internet Order. In order to facilitate
the analysis, this article presumes that the 2015 Open Internet case can be
described as including a major question, that is, a case with significant
economic and political ramifications.

III. Lessons from Supreme Court Cases Applicable to the FCC’s
Reclassification Decision
A. Three Cases with Lessons for the 2015 Open Internet Order

Utility Air Regulation Group v. EPA concerned the EPA’s statutory
interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).44
The Court analyzed the case under the Chevron framework, and rejected
the EPA’s interpretation because it exceeded the boundary of a reasonable
interpretation.45 The lessons generated by UARG and subsequent cases will
be applied in Part II.b to examine the 2015 Open Internet Order.
In UARG, the EPA argued that its motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas
regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the
CAA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) and Title V
programs for stationary sources solely on the basis that stationary sources

40. Id.
41. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120.
42. There are different views (such as focusing on the text of the statute versus focusing on
the intent of Congress) regarding the proper way to conduct statutory interpretation when a
reviewing court conducts the search for statutory clarity in Chevron step 1.
43. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. (“Deference under Chevron to an agency’s
construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
has intended such an implicit delegation.”). Apparently, the question in the tobacco case was
extraordinary.
44. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2453 (2014).
45. Id. at 2443–44
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emit greenhouse gases.46 The Court rejected EPA’s assertion under
Chevron step 2 analysis, finding that interpretation was not permissible.47
The Court reasoned that, in order to determine if an interpretation is
reasonable, the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous provision must be
consistent “with the design and structure of the statute as a whole.”48 The
first lesson from UARG is that a reasonable statutory interpretation must
account for both the specific language in the provision under investigation
and the overall design and structure of the governing act. The EPA
acknowledged that its interpretation would unreasonably incorporate a
tremendous number of small stationary sources into the two programs
when the permitting requirements were clearly intended by Congress to
apply only to a handful of large sources.49
Second, the Court reasoned that the EPA’s interpretation was
unreasonable given its significant impact on the economy, and it was
unclear whether Congress intended the EPA to have the discretion to make
such a major decision.50 UARG indicates that Congress unlikely delegated
interpretive authority to an agency for such a major question as it had
earlier concluded in Brown & Williamson. This lesson is a manifestation of
the failure of the Chevron framework to provide for an effective judicial
check on interpretations by the executive branch that may aggrandize its
quasi-legislative power.
Finally, the EPA tried to save its interpretation by tailoring language in
another part of the CAA, which contained unambiguous numerical
thresholds that trigger PSD and Title V permitting.51 The EPA adjusted
“the levels at which a source’s greenhouse-gas emissions would oblige it to
undergo PSD and Title V permitting.”52 Specifically, the EPA raised these
numerical thresholds in order to accommodate its interpretation to the
realities of the much higher volume of greenhouse-gas emissions than those
of conventional pollutants.53 The majority was dismayed at such a

46. Id. at 2434. The EPA first argued that its interpretation was compelled but the Court
disagreed. The analysis in this article focuses on EPA’s alternative position, based on an
assumption that the statute is ambiguous.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2442.
49. Id. at 2443.
50. Id. at 2444. The Court’s reasoning relied on its analysis in Brown & Williamson:
“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a
significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet its announcement with a
measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
51. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
52. Id. at 2444–45.
53. Id. at 2445.
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transparent assertion of legislative power by the EPA, and in harsh words
concluded that the tailoring rule was a blow to the Constitution’s separation
of powers doctrine since the agency had no authority to rewrite
unambiguous language of Congress.54 The third lesson of UARG shows
that when Congress provides unambiguous language in one part of a
statute, an agency is not free to amend that language in order to make its
interpretation of another part of the statute reasonable.
King v. Burwell55 provides additional insight to how the Court may
approach its review of the 2015 Open Internet Order. King involved the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) interpretation of a provision in the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).56 The majority rejected use of the Chevron
framework and developed its own de novo interpretation of what
constitutes an ambiguous statute; ironically, the same interpretation the IRS
had proposed.57 Rejecting use of the Chevron framework is surprising at
first blush, because the IRS’s interpretation involved a political decision
involving a policy tradeoff between two objectives—universal health
insurance and federalism—of the ACA. The Chevron framework typically
applied to situations involving an ambiguous provision with alternative
interpretations that each resolve a policy conflict—the conflict between
economic growth and environmental protection—in a different way.58 A
policy conflict emanating from alternative interpretations involving
predominantly political, not legal, considerations is a prototypical
candidate for Chevron deference.
The Court rejected utilizing the Chevron two-step test for two reasons.
First, the Court invoked the major question exception using Brown &
Williamson language denoting a question of deep “economic and political
significance,” and thus characterized the case as extraordinary.59 This
allowed the Court to reject the Chevron assumption that statutory
ambiguity meant that Congress intended for an agency to fill in the gaps in
the statute.60 The Court may refuse to use the Chevron framework if it
concludes that the question at issue is so important or major that the Court
should have the power to resolve any ambiguity.61 This approach may be

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2445–46.
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Abigail R. Moncrieff, King, Chevron, and the Age of Textualism, 95 B.U. L. REV.
ANNEX 1, 4 (2015).
59. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
60. Id.
61. See id. A common objection to this position is whether one can identify a standard to
distinguish major from minor questions that is administrable. It is at least arguable that the
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repeated in future cases as the Court becomes increasingly concerned with
encroachment by the executive branch on the powers belonging to the two
other branches of government.62
The second reason offered in King for rejecting Chevron deference is
that the IRS lacked expertise in crafting health insurance policy.63 This
directly challenges an assumption of Chevron that politically accountable
agencies are more qualified to resolve policy conflicts than unelected
judges. The takeaway appears to be that it is now the prerogative of the
courts to decide if the agency that Congress has charged with administering
a statute is qualified to do so. This opens up a new avenue of attack, with
no specified boundaries, for courts to challenge the legitimacy of the
Chevron framework.64
City of Arlington v. FCC65 predicts a likely outcome of the challenge to
the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order. City of Arlington addressed whether
Chevron deference is appropriate in a situation where the question of
interest concerned the scope of the FCC’s jurisdiction.66 Using the
Chevron framework, the Court ultimately found the statute to be
unambiguous and thus the FCC’s interpretation of its own statutory
jurisdiction was a reasonable construction.67 In short, Chevron deference
applies to questions both plainly within an agency’s authority and to those
that test the boundaries of that authority.68
Both sides of the opinion seem to indicate that it is futile for the Court
to attempt to distinguish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional
interpretations.69 Instead, the disagreement centered on the majority’s
position that general grant of rulemaking power was sufficient to indicate
that Congress intended for the agency to resolve the ambiguity, or the
interpretation in Chevron had economic and political consequences for the American economy
that were major.
62. Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What Does It Portend for
Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 80–81 (2015) (“King may also suggest that our onetime expectations regarding judicial deference to agency interpretations may require
reevaluation.”).
63. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
64. Another unusual aspect of the case is the ACA seem to give the IRS authority to resolve
an ambiguity over the specific provision in question. Lederman & Dugan, supra note 62, at 75.
65. City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
66. Id. at 1866.
67. Id. at 1874.
68. Id. at 1868.
69. Justice Scalia most eloquently described why the distinction is without merit: “The
argument against deference rests on the premise that there exist two distinct classes of agency
interpretations: Some interpretations-—the big, important ones, presumably—define the agency’s
‘jurisdiction.’ Others—humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff—are simply applications of jurisdiction
the agency plainly has. That premise is false, because the distinction between ‘jurisdictional’ and
‘nonjurisdictional’ is a mirage.” Id.

2016

WILL THE FCC OPEN INTERNET ORDER RECEIVE CHEVRON DEFERENCE?

207

dissent’s position that the Court should decide de novo that Congress
delegated authority to resolve the specific provision and question of
interest. In short, the dissent unsuccessfully argued for adding another
threshold step zero condition prior to application of the Chevron
framework.70
The controversy in City of Arlington illuminates the majority’s interest
in preserving Chevron deference because it allocates interpretative power
to the executive branch at the expense of the judiciary. However, the
dissent’s concern is that the judiciary retains an ability to monitor the
distribution of legislative power from the legislative branch to the
executive branch. The lesson of City of Arlington shows that beneath the
surface of the case is a simmering, ongoing disagreement among the
Supreme Court regarding the most important role of the judiciary in an era
of a growing administrative state, the increasing tendency of Congress to
write complicated and ambiguous statutes, and a well-established judicial
precedent in Chevron which favors allocation of interpretive power to
agencies.71 The majority won this battle for retaining the interpretative
power of an agency, but a similar battle will likely take place over the
interpretative power exercised by the FCC in its reclassification decision in
the 2015 Open Internet Order.
B. Application of the Lessons to the FCC’s Reclassification decision

Under the Brand X decision, the Court may determine that it should
apply the Chevron framework, or at least the threshold conditions for the
framework to analyze the reclassification decision. The Court could strike
down the FCC’s decision at step zero (as in King and the dissent in City of
Arlington), at Chevron step 1 (as in Brown & Williamson), or at Chevron
step 2 (as in UARG). On the other hand, Brand X and the majority decision
in City of Arlington seem to favor the FCC’s position.
Following a lesson from UARG, one argument for invalidating the FCC
reclassification decision centers on whether an interpretation that BIAS is a
telecommunications service can be determined to reside outside the policy
space of reasonable interpretations, given the design and structure of the
statute as a whole. Arguably, the FCC interpretation is inconsistent with

70. Id. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
71. Andrew M. Grossman, City of Arlington v. FCC: Justice Scalia’s Triumph, CATO
SUPREME COURT REV. 331, 332 (2012-2013) (“Scalia’s majority opinion sets the stage for a
heated debate with Chief Justice John Roberts, writing in dissent, on the role of the courts in
policing the administrative state. Where Scalia is concerned about marking the boundary
between the judicial branch and the political branches, the chief justice frets over Congress’s
unbounded delegation of authority to administrative agencies, which themselves are barely
checked by the president or the courts.”).
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the deregulatory objective of the 1996 Telecommunications Act
amendments72 to the Communications Act.73 If the Court agrees that a
telecommunications service interpretation is inconsistent with the design
and structure of the 1996 Act as a whole, a reviewing court is likely to
reject the FCC interpretation at step 2 of the Chevron analysis.
However, this argument can be rebutted in several ways. First, one can
view the development of broadband access technologies as the next step in
the technological evolution of communications networks. Instead of
separate networks dedicated to the delivery of voice (telephones), video
(cable), and data (Internet), broadband networks are capable of delivering
any type of digital content. The traditional FCC focus on last-mile access
networks has remained consistent. Second, it is likely that Congress, when
it enacted the 1996 Act, expected last-mile access networks would continue
to be subject to regulation.74 Paradoxically, the prior FCC 2002 decision to
refrain from regulating broadband access networks may have come as a
surprise to Congress. Third, the FCC’s decision to regulate broadband
access networks is tied to substantial forbearance from Title II regulations
in order to adapt telephone regulation to the evolution of convergent
broadband communications networks. The FCC has expansive authority to
utilize its forbearance power without violating congressional intent.75
Finally, an equally important objective of the 1996 Act is to promote the
development and deployment of advanced communications technologies.
Thus, the FCC interpretation can be characterized as an example of the
prototypical Chevron policy tradeoff between competing objectives—
deregulation and broadband deployment—which is best resolved by an
agency using its expert training and political values and judgments. In
summary, the Court in UARG rejected the EPA’s interpretation because it
was an unreasonable interpretation of an unambiguous statute. Here,
72. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
73. Justin Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, 10 PERSPECTIVES FROM
FSF SCHOLARS 1, 2 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://freestatefoundation.org/images/Regulating_the_
Most_Powerful_Network_Ever_021815.pdf (“It is hard to square the application of Title II . . . to
the Internet, or even to just broadband Internet access service. This is particularly hard to justify
following the 1996 Act, which was enacted ‘to promote competition and reduce
regulation’ . . . .”). Of course, it is an exaggeration to say that the FCC has proposed to regulate
the Internet as opponents to the FCC’s reclassification often try to frame the issue. Rather,
regulation is narrowly targeted to providers of last-mile broadband access services to end users.
74. Verizon v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 755 F.3d 623, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen
Congress passed section 706(a) in 1996, it did so against the backdrop of the Commission’s long
history of subjecting to common carrier regulation the entities that controlled the last-mile
facilities over which end users accessed the Internet.”). Section 706 is a provision of the 1996
Act that together with Title II form the basis of the FCC’s authority to regulate BIAS. The D.C.
Circuit remanded the case back to the FCC, and after an extensive notice-and-comment
proceeding, the agency issued the 2015 Open Internet Order.
75. This point about forbearance authority will be developed further below.
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however, the Court is unlikely to strike down the FCC’s interpretation on
those same grounds.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the 2015 Open Internet Order
concerns the economic and political significance of the reclassification
decision. This issue has played a role in the aforementioned lessons
identified in all three of the Supreme Court cases discussed above. The
D.C. Circuit addressed this specific issue in its examination of the FCC’s
previous effort to impose open internet rules and concluded that “[t]he
circumstances here are entirely different.”76 The D.C. Circuit distinguished
the tobacco case: “[t]he Court emphasized that the FDA had not only
completely disclaimed any authority to regulate tobacco products, but had
done so for more than eighty years, and that Congress had repeatedly
legislated against this background.”77 There is no similar denial of
regulatory authority or subsequent legislation by the FCC or Congress,
respectively, that involves the Internet. Although the D.C. Circuit
recognized that regulation of BIAS can be described as involving decisions
of great economic and political significance, it concluded that there was
“little reason given this history to think that Congress could not have
delegated some of these decisions to the Commission.”78 Thus, in the
opinion of the D.C. Circuit, the step zero threshold that Congress had
intended to assign authority to the FCC to resolve an ambiguous statute
was satisfied.79
On the other hand, the Court rejected utilization of the Chevron
framework in King. One reason was based on the perceived lack of
competency of the assigned agency to deal with the health insurance issues
under consideration. This argument should not apply to the FCC because
there is little doubt that the FCC possesses the expertise to address complex
communications issues and the general rulemaking power to issue rules
carrying the force of law.
The second reason involved the major question nature of the issue and
the King majority’s finding that the intent of the enacting Congress was
clear, despite the arguably ambiguous language in the provision at issue.80
If the majority had granted deference to the IRS under Chevron Step 2,
then, a future administration would retain the option to consider changing

76. Verizon, 755 F.3d at 638.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 639.
79. Id. In different words, the D.C. Circuit found the question of regulating broadband
access providers could not be described as an “elephant” and the FCC’s authority for such
regulation is not contained in statutory language described as a “mousehole.”
80. Moncrieff, supra note 58, at 5–7. The majority could not resolve the question under
Chevron step 1 given the ambiguous statutory language.
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the interpretation. In fact, this flexibility is a significant advantage of the
Chevron framework. The majority did not want to permit this flexibility
given their understanding of the intent of Congress. The circumstances of
this case are rather unique81 and it is unlikely that such reasoning would be
applicable to the FCC reclassification decision. In short, the lessons of the
King decision probably have little relevance to the evaluation of the 2015
Open Internet Order.
Another threat to the legitimacy of the FCC’s reclassification decision
is based on a lesson from UARG, where the EPA developed a tailoring rule
in hope of making its interpretation reasonable. In UARG, the EPA rewrote
clear statutory terms to change how the statute would operate.82 The FCC’s
reliance on forbearance to adapt Title II regulations to the Internet may be
subject to a similar criticism.83 This objection can be effectively rebutted.84
First, the EPA’s tailoring rule was deemed unconstitutional because it
violated the separation of powers doctrine. In contrast, the FCC has
unambiguous statutory authority to tailor Title II regulations for a class of
carriers such as providers of BIAS.85 In addition, the FCC has considerable
discretion and flexibility in its use of its forbearance power. Particularly,
the FCC has expansive authority to use predictive judgments as an expert
agency regarding its assessment of the need for specific Title II regulations,
given the adequacy of other protections to control the behavior of
broadband service providers.
Second, in his Brand X dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the FCC
should have classified cable modem access service to include a
telecommunications component and used its forbearance authority to the
extent that it thought necessary to limit the Title II regulations imposed on
cable modem Internet access providers.86 To a large extent, this is the path
chosen by the FCC in the 2015 Open Internet order. In sum, the UARG
lesson about unauthorized editing of a statutory provision—use of
forbearance power—to adopt an unreasonable interpretation of a statutory
provision—definition of telecommunications service applied to BIAS—is

81. The ACA became law without a single vote from the party in the minority.
82. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Hurwitz, supra note 73, at 12 (“The Chairman’s proposed ‘modernization’ of Title II is
clearly an effort to ‘revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice’ and to
‘rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.’”).
84. Daniel Deacon, Title II Reclassification: A Reply to Gus Hurwitz, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/title-ii-reclassifi
cation-a-reply-to-gus-hurwitz-by-daniel-deacon.
85. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
86. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1011–12 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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likely irrelevant given the significant differences in legal authority of the
two agencies.
Given the Brand X decision, it is unlikely that the courts will conclude
that the definition of telecommunications service is unambiguous in a
Chevron step 1 analysis, and thus exclude the possibility that BIAS could
be reasonably classified as a telecommunications service.
The final consideration based on the lessons of the all three
aforementioned cases, particularly the disagreement between Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice Roberts in the undertones of City of Arlington, concerns
the future of Chevron deference in an environment in which more Supreme
Court justices are questioning the constitutional basis of the doctrine. The
Chevron framework has been subjected to close scrutiny since its inception.
Judicial efforts have successfully placed limits on Chevron. A judicial
decision that significantly disrupts the existing equilibrium in the
distribution of power between the branches of government is going to be
subjected to feedback efforts to distribute power back to the previous
equilibrium. Each of the cases reviewed manifested these equilibrating
tendencies in some form. The main focus of the conflict seems to be
between proponents regarding the proper allotment of power vested in the
executive or the judicial branches, with the legislative branch relatively
detached from the dispute.
Presently, a particular focus of interest centers on a case involving what
is claimed to be a major question issue, or question about an agency’s
jurisdiction. In City of Arlington, the majority was comfortable with the
idea that the Chevron framework is capable of addressing these types of
issues.87 It is incumbent on the judges to perform three judicial functions
consistent with the Chevron framework: (1) use the ordinary tools of
statutory interpretation to search for clear congressional intent in the
statutory language in question;88 (2) ensure that an agency’s interpretation
is located within the set of reasonable policy options; and (3) ensure that
the agency did not engage in arbitrary or capricious decision making given
the policy option selected. If judges perform these functions diligently, the
87. City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013) (“The U.S.
Reports are shot through with applications of Chevron to agencies’ constructions of the scope of
their own jurisdiction. And we have applied Chevron where concerns about agency selfaggrandizement are at their apogee: in cases where an agency’s expansive construction of the
extent of its own power would have wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.”).
88. It is predicted that for questions implicating the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction, judges
might be more likely to engage in aggressive statutory interpretation in a search for clear
meaning. In such a case, they can apply the Chevron framework but not defer to the agency
interpretation. See Peter M. Shane, City of Arlington v. FCC: Boon to the Administrative State or
Fodder for Law Nerds?, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 7, 2013), http://www.bna.com/city-ofarlington-v-fcc-boon-to-the-administrative-state-or-fodder-for-law-nerds/.

212

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[38:2

Chevron framework should continue to be utilized to resolve cases
involving statutory ambiguity even in cases involving major questions.89
There are indications that some justices are likely to take a more
critical view of the ongoing viability of Chevron deference, especially in
circumstances involving major questions. Critics believe that the balance
of power between the branches of government is considered to be seriously
off balance and Chevron deference is in part responsible.90 At minimum,
the Court is looking for ways to increase the boundary maintenance
responsibility of the judiciary to ensure that an agency is acting within its
delegated authority. Perhaps the most immediate challenge to the Chevron
framework is captured in Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in Michigan
v. EPA. There, Justice Thomas questioned the constitutionality of the
Court’s practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.91
Specifically, he questions the legislative and interpretative power
transferred to the executive branch as a result of Chevron deference. As a
potential direct threat to the 2015 Open Internet Order, Justice Thomas
concluded his concurrence with the following sentence: “We should stop to
consider that document [the Constitution] before blithely giving the force
of law to any other agency ‘interpretations’ of federal statutes.”92 This
concern reflects much more than a concern with agency deference in cases
involving major questions. Ironically, this warning comes from a justice
who wrote the majority opinion in Brand X, a case that can be viewed as a
model for the application of the Chevron framework, which is not a good
sign for a doctrine’s future if it loses one of its greatest proponents.
There are additional signs among other conservative justices that the
future viability of the Chevron framework may be in trouble.93 Clearly,
Chief Justice Roberts prefers to limit the reach of the doctrine. His use of
the major questions exception in King and his increasing concern with the
growth of the administrative state could portend efforts to continue to
narrow the reach of agency deference. Critics are concerned about the lack

89. It may well be that an agency because of its expertise and politically accountability is
better prepared than courts to resolve major questions. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 231–44.
90. Professor Merrill argues that Chevron hampers the ability of courts to police the
boundary between the executive and legislative branches of government. Merrill, supra note 37.
91. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 2714 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93. Examples of unrest with agency deference has been reflected in opinions by
conservative justices in the Court’s last term. Joel Alicea, The Supreme Court’s 2014-2015 Term:
The Year the Administrative State Trembled, PUB. DISCOURSE (Sept. 2015), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/09/15594/.
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of presidential involvement in supervision of agency interpretations.94 This
leads to the charge that agencies are unsupervised and unaccountable to the
electorate which violates a fundamental assumption of the Chevron
framework that agencies should rely on the President’s views regarding
wise policy.95 There is no question that the President was involved in the
FCC’s reclassification decision, which suggests that such a criticism in the
2015 Open Internet case lacks merit.96
Thus, even though the
reclassification decision was made by an agency based on its expertise and
subject to political accountability, there is still a chance that, because of a
general discontent among some on the Court about the growing power of
the administrative state in general, the reclassification decision will not
receive Chevron deference.

IV. Conclusion
If one would ignore recent history, the 2015 Open Internet Order would
be very likely to receive Chevron deference. However, in light of recent
Supreme Court opinions, it is now less likely that deference will be
granted. A critical issue will be how the Court chooses to address the
significant economic and political consequences of the reclassification
decision. A broad reading of the reach of the Chevron framework will
favor the executive branch in general and the FCC in particular. For those
who have more faith in the judiciary, especially in an era of a growing
administrative state, a narrow reading is more likely. A narrow reading
increases the probability that the importance of the issue will cause the
reviewing court to undertake a thorough step zero analysis to determine if
Congress intended to assign authority to the FCC to resolve the issue. This
increases the likelihood that the reviewing court will side with the
opponents of reclassification. In conclusion, taking into consideration all

94. Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, Chevron
Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 433, 442–46 (2010). May is particularly concerned with
the lack of presidential control over regulatory decisions made by independent agencies. Id.
95. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 855–56 (1984) (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.”).
96. From a different vantage point regarding presidential involvement, it has been argued
that because of the President’s involvement with the agency, the FCC may have at the last
moment changed its policy recommendation and this may mean that the FCC will receive little or
no deference. Randolph J. May, Why Chevron Deference May Not Save the FCC’s Open Internet
Order—Part II, 10 PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF SCHOLARS, (May 4, 2015).
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of the arguments for and against the FCC’s decision to regulate BIAS, the
best guess to the Chevron deference question posed in the title of the article
is yes—or in probability terms, about a seventy-five percent chance—the
FCC will be granted Chevron deference.

